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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Forty-six-year-old Lisa Renee Hensdell was found guilty of leaving the scene of
an injury accident. The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two
years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Ms. Hensdell on supervised
probation. Just over a year after Ms. Hensdell was sentenced, the district court ordered
her to pay $36,317.07 in restitution, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. On appeal,
Ms. Hensdell asserts that the district court exceeded its authority by entering the
restitution order in contravention of I. C. § 19-5304(6).

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After a jury trial, Ms. Hensdell was found guilty of one count of leaving the scene
of an injury accident, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-8007, one count of inattentive
driving, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 49-1401 (3), and one count of driving without
privileges, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001 (3). 1 (R., pp.53-54, 64, 186-87,
198.) The district court held a sentencing hearing on June 27, 2011. (R., p.197.) For
the leaving the scene of an injury accident count, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed. 2

1

(R., p.200.)

The district court then

The leaving the scene of an injury accident and inattentive driving counts were both in
Bannock County Case No. CR 2010-4854. (R., p.198.) The driving without privileges
count was in Bannock County Case No. CR 2010-4587, consolidated with No.
CR 2010-4584. (R., pp.64, 198.)
2 For the inattentive driving count, the district court imposed 90 days in the county jail.
(R., p.200.) For the driving without privileges count, the district court imposed 180 days
in the county jail. (R., pp.200-01.) The sentences for the inattentive driving and driving
without privileges counts were to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for the
leaving the scene of an injury accident count. (R., p.200.)
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suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Hensdell on supervised probation for a period
of five years. (R., p.201.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked the State, "[H]ow much time
are you going to require for restitution?"

(Tr., p.484, Ls.18-19.)

The State told the

district court: "I would think we should be able to get that compiled within a month, Your
Honor." (Tr., p.484, Ls.20-21.) The district court then decided to "hold the restitution
hearing at the time of the status hearing on September 26, 2011." (Tr., p.484, Ls.2224.) The judgment of conviction stated that "[t]he Court determines that this case is [or]
may be appropriate for restitution, and a restitution hearing will be held at the time of the
status conference on September 26, 2011." (R., p.202.)
Before the date of the status hearing, the Idaho Department of Correction filed a
report of probation violation alleging that Ms. Hensdell violated the terms and conditions
of her probation by failing to report to her supervising officer as directed, failing to obtain
full-time employment, using or possessing illegal drugs, and possessing firearms.
(R., pp.215-17.)

The State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Hensdell's probation.

(R., pp.219-20.) Ms. Hensdell denied the alleged probation violations. (R., pp.228-29.)
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Ms. Hensdell had violated her
probation. (R., pp.231-33.) On October 3, 2011, the district court revoked her probation
and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.237-41.)

The order revoking probation stated that

"[t]he Court determines that this is or maybe an appropriate case for restitution and
restitution will be addressed at the Rider Review Hearing." (R., p.240.)
Ms. Hensdell then participated in a "rider" program, and at the rider review
hearing on April 2, 2012, the district court placed her on supervised probation for a
period of five years. (R., pp.259-63.) The review hearing order stated that "[t]he Court
2

determines that this case may be appropriate for restitution, but restitution shall be held
open until the 90 day status hearing." (R., p.262.)
The district court held the 90 day status hearing on July 2, 2012.
Ls.7-12.)

(Tr., p.487,

The State requested restitution in the total amount of $36,317.07. 3

Tr., p.490, L.17 -

p.491, L.10.)

(See

The district court then awarded $36,317.07 in

restitution, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304. (R., pp.246, 291-92; Tr., p.491, Ls.8-10.) Of that
total amount, $1,172.14 would go to the victim, Jose Sanchez, and $35,144.93 would
go to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.

(R., pp.246, 291-92; Tr., p.491,

Ls.10-13.) The district court gave Ms. Hensdell 30 days to file any request for reduction
of those amounts. (R., p.290; Tr., p.491, Ls.14-15.) However, Ms. Hensdell did not file
a request for reduction.
Ms. Hensdell then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's
restitution order. (R., pp.294-96.)

3

The State had initially requested slightly more restitution in the total amount of
$36,333.02 (R., pp.287-88), but later asked the district court to remove a $15.95 flu shot
from the request (Tr., p.490, L.17 - p.491, L.10).
3

ISSUE
Did the district court exceed its authority by entering the restitution order in
contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6)?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Exceeded Its Authority By Entering The Restitution Order In
Contravention Of I.C. § 19-5304(6)
Ms. Hensdell asserts that the district court exceeded its authority by entering the
restitution order in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6), because it did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards in entering the restitution order.
A district court may enter a restitution order "at the time of sentencing or such
later date as deemed necessary by the court."

I.C. § 19-5304(6).

This provision

"contemplates that the court may need to grant the prosecution a reasonable amount of
time necessary to gather information so as to locate all victims and correctly compute
the amount of restitution."

State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App. 2002)

(emphasis in original). A district court's decision to order restitution within the time limits
found in I.C. § 19-5304(6) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Jensen,
149 Idaho 758, 761-63 (Ct. App. 2010).
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.

Id. at 763 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989)).
In Ferguson, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated an award of restitution, in part,
because the State failed to show that it was "necessary" to delay the entry of the order
of restitution until about six years after sentencing. Ferguson, 138 Idaho at 662. The
Court therefore held "that the trial court acted without authority when it entered the order
of restitution," and accordingly vacated the district court's award of restitution. Id.
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Similarly, in Jensen the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated an amended order of
restitution entered more than six years after sentencing, because "[t]he district court
made no finding, nor on the state of the record could it do so, that the delay was
reasonably necessary for the processing of the request for restitution." Jensen, 149
Idaho at 762-63. In Jensen, "[t]he State did not present evidence that the delay from
sentencing to seeking restitution was necessary." Id. at 763. "The State acknowledged
that the delay was not because of the time needed to process the request, but because
the case 'fell through the cracks."'

Id.

The Idaho Court of Appeals held that "[t]he

district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards in entering the
amended order of restitution. . . . The district court, in entering the amended order of
restitution, exceeded its authority under I.C. § 19-5304(6)." Id. Thus, the Court vacated
the district court's amended order of restitution. Id. at 764.
As in Ferguson and Jensen, the district court in this case did not find that the
delay in entering the restitution order was reasonably necessary. (See R., pp.246, 29192.)

But Ms. Hensdell did not object on this basis before the district court.

"The

fundamental error doctrine allows a criminal defendant the opportunity, in strictly limited
circumstances, to raise an issue challenging his conviction on direct appeal that was not
State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 834

formally preserved before the trial court."
(Ct. App. 2010).

However, in Mosqueda the Idaho Court of Appeals held "that the

fundamental error doctrine may not be invoked to raise a restitution issue for the first
time on appeal because restitution proceedings are civil in nature." Id.
Mindful of Mosqueda, Ms. Hensdell asserts that district court exceeded its
authority by entering the restitution order in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6), because
it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards in entering the restitution
6

order. Here, the district court made no finding that the delay in entering the restitution
order just over a year after sentencing (from June 27, 2011 to July 2, 2012) was
reasonably necessary for processing the State's request for restitution. By entering the
restitution order without finding that the delay was reasonably necessary, the district
court acted in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6). See Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762-63.
Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards in
entering the restitution order. See id. Ms. Hensdell therefore asserts that the district
court exceeded its authority by entering the restitution order in contravention of
I.C. § 19-5304(6), because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards
in entering the restitution order. The restitution order should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Hensdell respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the restitution order.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2013.

~r~-

BEN PATRICKMCGREE\/Y'
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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